# The Distributional Effects of Inflation on the Labor Market

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April 20, 2024 Evolving...

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- · Some speculation that inflation:
  - has reduced firms' bargaining power by making workers more elastic
  - $\cdot$  is good for low-wage workers because it has increased their relative wages
- How does all this work in a micro-founded model? Are low-wage workers actually made better off from inflationary periods?

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- Develop a model with heterogeneous workers, frictional labor markets with many types of endogenous worker flows, and endogenous wage markdowns to explore the effects of inflation on worker wages and utility.
- Model shows that the effect of inflation on inequality has multiple effects, some of which go in opposite directions.
- Quantitatively, we show that the recent inflation episode had little effect on U.S. wage inequality; show all worker types are worse off by roughly the same amount from temporary "inflation" shock.


#### LITERATURE

- Evidence on the effects of inflation on the labor market Blanco, Drenik, Zaratiegui (2024), Autor, Dube and McGrew (2023), Pilossoph and Ryngaert (2023)
- Yet, households dislike inflation, especially for its effect on their labor income Shiller (1997), Stancheva (2024), Afrouzi, Dietrich, Myrseth, Priftis, and Schoenle (2024)
- Matching models of labor market with inflation and/or search heterogeneity Barro (1977); Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000); Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005); Hall (2005); Shimer (2005); Gertler and Trigari (2009); Menzio and Shi (2009); Rogerson and Shimer (2011); Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016, 2023), Hurst, Kehoe, Pastorino, and Winberry (2023), Blanco and Drenik (2023), Blanco, Drenik, Moser, and Zaratiegui (2024)

Motivating Facts Part 1:


Inflation and Labor Market Churn

# RECENT U.S. INFLATION COINCIDES WITH HIGHER JOB-TO-JOB (EE) FLOWS



- EE flows jumped in US right after inflationary period started
- Data from CPS, individuals aged 25-54; y-axis is percentage change in EE-flows relative to same month during pooled 2016-2019 period


# ... AND MORE SO AT THE BOTTOM




- EE flows jumped more during 2021M7-2022M12 period (relative to 2016-2019 period) for those with lower education
- Similar patterns documented in Autor, Dube, McGrew (2023) (and similar to patterns in Argentina after 2002 found in Blanco, Drenik, Zaratiegui (2024))

# Motivating Facts Part 2:


Inflation and Wage Inequality




- Wage growth between 5/21 and 5/23 higher for low wage workers (CPS data, Ages 25-54)
- · Replicates Autor, Dube, and McGrew (2023)



 Patterns slightly muted when we extend Autor et al (2023) sample from from Jan 21-Jan 24




• But note the pre-trends: Wages were growing faster at the bottom **before** the inflationary period (2017-2019)



 Similar patterns found in Argentina after the 2002 devaluation; see Blanco, Drenik, Zaratiegui (2024)

# DISPERSION OF WAGE GROWTH OVER TIME



- Inequality in US (as measured by variance of log wages) has been declining in the US since mid 2010s
- · No noticeable break in trend during inflation period

Model

# **MODEL OBJECTIVES**

To investigate the distributional effects of inflation on job flows and wage growth, we formulate a search and matching framework with:

- · Nominal wage rigidities:
  - Introduces a role for inflation to erode wages
  - · Workers can increase their wages through EUE, EE, or infrequent renegotiations
- Heterogeneous outside options & hiring costs to study inflation's impact on:
  - incentives across the distribution
  - flows across the distribution
  - the distribution of wages and markdowns

# MODEL OVERVIEW AND INGREDIENTS

- Time is continuous and is indexed by  $t \ge 0$
- · A unit measure of heterogeneous workers engage in directed search
- Employed workers produces with productivity Z
- Unemployed workers with prod. Z produce  $B \times Z^{\phi_B}$ 
  - $\phi_B$  captures how home production scales with productivity
- Endogenous measure of homogeneous firms post vacancies at cost  $K \times Z^{\phi_K}$ 
  - $\phi_{K}$  captures how hiring costs scales with productivity

# **ENVIRONMENT: PREFERENCES AND TECHNOLOGY**

- Worker's State:  $E_{it}$ : employed  $(h_{it})$  or unemployed  $(u_{it})$
- Worker's Preferences:  $\mathbb{E}_0\left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t}(C_{i,t}-\mathcal{C}(S_{i,t},Z_{i,t}))dt\right]$  where

$$C(S,Z) = \mu_E \frac{S^{1+\phi_S^{-1}}}{1+\phi_S^{-1}} Z$$

- Worker's Productivity:  $Z_{i,t} = \exp(a_i + \hat{z}_{i,t})$ 
  - $a_i$  is a permanent productivity drawn at birth
  - $\hat{z}_{i,t}$  captures idiosyncratic productivity shocks:

$$d\hat{z}_{i,t} = \begin{cases} \gamma_E dt + \sigma_E dW_{i,t} \\ \gamma_U dt + \sigma_U dW_{i,t} \end{cases}$$

# **ENVIRONMENT: WITHIN JOB WAGE ADJUSTMENTS**

- Employed worker's nominal income:  $W_{i,t}$
- Inflation rate:  $d \ln(P_t) = \pi dt$  determined by the central bank
- Employed worker's (log) real income:  $W_{i,t} = \ln(W_{i,t}/P_t)$
- Fixed nominal wages:  $\implies$  real wages depreciate with inflation:  $dw_{i,t} = -\pi dt$
- Renegotiation opportunities arrive at Calvo rates  $\beta^{\pm}$  where  $(\beta^{+} \neq \beta^{-})$ 
  - · New wage is determined with Nash bargaining with weight  $\omega$  for worker

# **ENVIRONMENT: JOB-CREATION**

- Firms post vacancies V at cost  $K \times Z^{\phi_K}$ 
  - Free entry:  $K \times Z^{\phi_K} = \text{firm's expected value of finding a worker}$
- Markets: Indexed by (z; w), where w is real wage and  $z \equiv \ln(Z)$  is log-productivity.
- Matching function:  $m(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{S}) = \mathcal{S}^{\alpha} \mathcal{V}^{1-\alpha}, \ \alpha \in (0, 1)$ 
  - Average search intensity:  $S = \int_0^1 S_i(z; w) di$
  - Market tightness:  $\theta(z; w) = \mathcal{V}(w, z) / \mathcal{S}(w, z)$
  - Worker's matching rate:  $S_i f(\theta(z; w)) = S_i \theta(z; w)^{1-\alpha}$
  - Firm's matching rate:  $q(\theta(z; w)) = \theta(z; w)^{-\alpha}$

# **ENVIRONMENT: JOB-SEPARATIONS**

- Matches are exogenously dissolved at Poisson rates
  - $\circ$   $\delta$ : exogenous separations rate
  - $\circ$   $\chi$ : death rate
- Matches are **endogenously dissolved** either by firm (layoff) or worker (quit)
- Match duration: Time until first occurrence of any of these events

#### VALUE FUNCTIONS: UNEMPLOYED WORKER

$$(\rho + \chi)U(z,t) = \underbrace{e^{\phi_B z}B}_{\text{flow benefit}} \\ + \underbrace{\max_{S^*,W^*} \{S^*f(\theta_t(z,W^*)) \left(H(W^*,z,t) - U(z,t)\right) - \mu_U \frac{S^{*^{1+\phi_S^{-1}}}}{1+\phi_S^{-1}} e^z\}}_{\text{gains from finding a job}} \\ + \underbrace{U_t(z,t) + \gamma_u U_z(z,t) + \frac{\sigma_u^2}{2} U_{zz}(z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}}$$

•  $w_u^*(z)$  and  $s_u^*(z)$  are the optimal wage and search effort for the unemployed worker with productivity z

#### VALUE FUNCTIONS: EMPLOYED WORKER

$$\rho H(w,z,t) = \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \rho U(z,t) \ , \quad e^w \\ \text{outside option flow wage} \end{array} \right. \\ \left. - \underbrace{\delta(H(w,z,t) - U(z,t))}_{\text{losses from exog. separation losses from exog. death losses from inflation} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\beta^+ \Delta^+ H(w,z,t) + \beta^- \Delta^- H(w,z,t)}_{\text{gains or losses from wage increases or decreases}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\max_{s^*,w^*} \left\{ s^* f(\theta_t(z,w^*)) \left( H(w^*,z,t) - H(w,z,t) \right) - \mu_h \frac{s^{*^{1+\phi_s^{-1}}}}{1+\phi_s^{-1}} e^z \right\}}_{\text{gains from on-the-job search}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{H_t(w,z,t) + \gamma_e H_z(w,z,t) + \frac{\sigma_e^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,z,t)}_{\text{differential value from time and productivity changes}} \right. \\ \left. + \underbrace{\frac{\delta^2}{2} H_{zz}(w,$$

### **VALUE FUNCTIONS: UNMATCHED FIRMS**

$$\rho V(w,z,t) = \underbrace{-e^{\phi_K z} K}_{\text{vacancy cost}} + \underbrace{q(\theta_t(w_{jj}^*(w,z),z))(J(w_{jj}^*(w,z),z,t) - V(w,z,t))}_{\text{expected gains from being matched}}, \forall (w,z)$$

• Free entry condition: V(w,z) = 0,  $\forall (w,z) \Longrightarrow$  Unmatched firms are indifferent across markets

### **VALUE FUNCTIONS: MATCHED FIRMS**


$$\rho J(w,z,t) = \max \left\{ \begin{array}{ccc} \rho V(w,z,t) &, e^z - e^w & -J_w(w,z,t)\pi_t \\ & \text{outside option (=0)} & \text{flow profit} & \text{gains from wage erosion} \end{array} \right. \\ \left. - \left( \delta + \chi + s_e(w^*(w,z),z) f(\theta_t(w^*_{jj}(w,z)),z) \right) \left( J(w,z,t) - V(w,z,t) \right) \\ & \text{losses from separation} \right. \\ \left. + \beta^+ \Delta^+ J(w,z,t) + \beta^- \Delta^- J(w,z,t) \\ & \text{change in value from wages increases or decreases} \right. \\ \left. + J_t(w,z,t) + \gamma_e J_z(w,z,t) + \frac{\sigma_e^2}{2} J_{zz}(w,z,t) \right\} \\ & \text{differential value from wage and prod. changes} \end{array}$$


where


$$\Delta^{+}J(w,z,t) = J(\max\{w_{b}^{*}(w,z),w\},z,t) - J(w,z,t)$$
  
$$\Delta^{-}J(w,z,t) = J(\min\{w_{b}^{*}(w,z),w\},z,t) - J(w,z,t)$$


How the Model Works:

Role of Heterogeneity











Data suggests we are either in  $\phi_B = \phi_K = 1$  or (more generally)  $\phi_B < 1, \phi_K > 1$ 

# JOB FINDING RATE OF MEDIAN EMPLOYED WORKER ACROSS MODELS



Data again suggests we are in the region where  $\phi_K > 1$ 

#### **MARKDOWNS**




Data again suggests we are in the region where  $\phi_{K} > 1$  and/or  $\phi_{B} < 1$ 

# "CALIBRATION"; KEY PARAMETERS

Parameter	Description	Value
ñ	Trend inflation	0.02/year
$\gamma_e$	Drift id. prod. — employed	0.024/year
$\gamma_{u}$	Drift id. prod. — unemployed	-0.036/year
δ	Ex. separation rate	0.024/month
$\beta^+$	Probability of positive $\Delta w$	0.2/month
$\beta^-$	Probability of negative $\Delta w$	0.01/month
$\phi_{K}$	Scaling factor vacancy cost wrt z	1.3
$\phi_B$	Scaling factor income during unemployment wrt z	0.93


#### MARKDOWN DEFINITION

- Define  $\hat{\mathbf{w}} = \mathbf{z} \mathbf{w}$  (markdown)
- Explore how values evolve for workers with differing markdowns and levels of productivity




Worker Values vs. Markdowns

1. Worker value is higher with higher productivity but non-monotonic in markdown because of layoff risk




Worker Values vs. Markdowns

2. Workers enter at the circle and climb to the square; markdowns are roughly the same and zero at the top of the job ladder




Worker Values vs. Markdowns

3. But more productive workers start from wages with *larger* markdowns because they dislike unemployment more and are harder to hire




Firm Values (Dashed = High Inflation)

4. With higher inflation all workers' asking wages shift to the right; higher inflation erodes wages faster, so workers opt for higher starting wages




Firm Values (Dashed = High Inflation)


5. Note that higher **permanent** inflation shifts worker values up and expands the ladder (and the layoff margin)




**Left:** Workers do not search at the top of their job ladder




**Left:** But their search effort increases when their wages deviate from this maximum value




**Left:** When wages are lower, they seek higher wages



**Left:** When wages are higher, they seek new jobs because they are likely to be laid off



**Right:** Lower productivity workers have smaller continuation regions because they are closer to their outside option **and** seek jobs in tighter markets




**Left:** Higher inflation shifts search effort towards higher wages **Right:** Higher inflation **relaxes** the layoff margin

# **High and Transitory Inflation:**


The experiment is an unexpected one-time increase in the price level of 18% today

#### **REAL WAGES AND MARKDOWNS**




1. On impact, wages of all types fall by 18% (panel (a)....  $\Delta\epsilon$  line)

#### **REAL WAGES AND MARKDOWNS**




2. Over time, wages recover, but do so faster for those at the bottom of the distribution

#### **REAL WAGES AND MARKDOWNS**



3. Markdowns recover within about a year (panel (b).... $\Delta$ 12 line)


#### **SEARCH EFFORT**




Percetange Changes in Search Effort

· Search effort increases most (early on) for those with lower productivity


#### **UNEMPLOYMENT RATE**




• Unemployment rate temporarily falls with temporary price increase - churn increases but layoffs decrease




- 1. Key Figure: Inflation unambiguously lowers welfare for all workers (blue line)
  - workers hate temporary bursts of inflation!



2. Increased search is costly to workers (needed to get real wages to catch up with inflation




3. Welfare losses slightly less for low productivity workers



4. All else equal, temporary inflation makes firms better off (green line)


# CHANGES IN VALUES OF EMPLOYED WORKERS, DIFFERENT SIZE PRICE INCREASES



Changes in Values for Different Inflation Rates

• Higher bursts of temporary inflation makes all workers worse off - workers hate inflation more when the temporary burst of inflation is larger


# **WAGE INEQUALITY**



Wage Inequality

1. Large temporary increase in price level (18%) has only a very small temporary effect on inequality


# **WAGE INEQUALITY**



Wage Inequality

2. Increase in within group inequality partially offsets temporary decline in cross-group inequality

#### **WAGE INEQUALITY**




Wage Inequality

3. **Take-Away**: Large temporary inflation is not something that meaningful effects inequality; makes all workers worse off by roughly the same amount

# High and Permanent Inflation:


The experiment is an unexpected permanent increase in the inflation rate to 18% going forward

#### **UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND SEARCH EFFORT**




1. **Key Take-Away**: Permanent increase in inflation leads to a permanent decline in unemployment; money is not neutral in long-run (panel (a))

#### UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND SEARCH EFFORT




2. Job-finding rate increases for all workers – due to increased search effort – making the duration of unemployment spells shorter (panel (b))


#### **UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND SEARCH EFFORT**




3. Search effort increases most for high productivity workers which will reduce their welfare (panel (b))




1. Permanent increase in inflation has no effect on wages on impact, wage growth increases over time (panel (a),  $\Delta \epsilon$  line)




2. Overtime, wages increase because productivity increases due to less time in unemployment (panel (a),  $\Delta$ 12 line)




3. After about a year, no substantive change in wage mark-downs for any type of worker (not shown on figure)




4. Wage effects similar for all types of workers; therefore no substantive effect on income inequality (panel (b))



• **Key Take-Away**: Higher permanent inflation has positive welfare effects on all workers; increases worker productivity by reducing time in unemployment



 Welfare gains are higher for low productivity workers (more disutility from increased search for high productivity workers)



Changes in Values for Different Inflation Rates

• **Key Take-Away**: But these gains are non-monotonic and are overturned by the lower average wages and shortened duration of matches


#### **FUTURE WORK**

- Precise calibration
- State-dependent renegotiation
  - · But note that this would mitigate inflationary effects even more
- · Monetary disturbances do not happen in vacuum
  - Think about joint effects of distributional shocks with a monetary response
  - · e.g., supply shocks (both aggregate and distributional)
- · Thinking about congestion externalities of one group on the other

#### CONCLUSION

- Main Contribution: Develop a framework to assess the effects of inflation on worker well-being in a modern macro model of the labor market.
- Inflation does affect labor market flows; additional search behavior makes workers worse off.
- Temporary bursts of inflation make all workers worse off
- Permanent changes in inflation can have long run productivity effects by reducing the time workers spend in unemployment.
- Even in a model with rich worker heterogeneity, both permanent and temporary changes in inflation have essentially no effect on wage inequality.

#### 2002 Argentina Inflation Coincided with Higher Wage Growth at the Bottom



- Wage growth after Argentina's 2002 devaluation, per income percentile.
- · Source: Blanco, Drenik, Zaratiegui (2024)

# "CALIBRATION"

Parameter	Description	Value
ρ	Discount factor	0.06/12.0
$\alpha$	Elasticity matching function	0.5
ñ	Trend inflation	0.02/12.0
$\omega$	Worker's bargaining power	0.5
$\chi$	Death rate	1.0/(30.0*12.0)
$\frac{\chi}{\tilde{K}}$	Vacancy cost	1.6
Ã	Income during unemployment	1.5
$\mu_{z_0}$	Mean initial productivity	0.0
$\sigma_{z_0}$	Std. initial productivity	0.17
$\gamma_e$	Drift id. prod. — employed	0.024/12
$\sigma_e$	Std. id. prod. — employed	0.037
$\gamma_{u}$	Drift id. prod. — unemployed	-0.036/12
$\sigma_{\it u}$	Std. id. prod. — unemployed	0.037
$\delta$	Ex. separation rate	0.024
$\mu_{\it e}$	Search cost scale — employed	1.2
$\mu_{u}$	Search cost scale — unemployed	1.0
$\phi_{K}$	Scaling factor vacancy cost wrt z	1.3
$\phi_B$	Scaling factor income during unemployment wrt z	0.93
$oldsymbol{eta}^+$	Probability of positive $\Delta w$	0.2
β-	Probability of negative <b>△</b> w	0.01

Appendix